In the recent times we hear increasingly often about cyber attacks on various commercial and strategic sites that manage to escape any defense. In this article we model such attacks on networks via stochastic processes and predict the time of a total or partial failure of a network including the magnitude of losses (such as the number of compromised nodes, lost weights, and a loss of other associated components relative to some fixed thresholds). To make such modeling more realistic we also assume that the information about the attacks is delayed as per random observations. We arrive at analytically and numerically tractable results demonstrated by examples and comparative simulation.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we consider a model of a large-scale stochastic network under a series of cyber attacks wherein successive random subgraphs are compromised (destroyed or otherwise prevented from normal operation) upon random time increments. With each node is an associated random weight representing the value of the node. Furthermore, we do not learn in real-time the extent of the damage: rather, the status of the cumulative damage is ascertained only upon an independent delayed renewal observation process.
Random graphs are very common in modeling various types of networks [6-7, 23, 27, 29-30, 32, 36 ], but few had cyber-crime as a focus [28, 31] . The classical random graphs of Erdös and Rènyi, G(n, M ), consist of n vertices with M edges chosen uniformly at random from the set of all possible adjacencies among the n vertices [17] [18] , but we consider rather pre-existing random graphs with randomly weighted nodes. As such, we model each individual attack as removing some random number of nodes along with their total weight. Models of cyber attacks sometimes consider a viral process spreading from one node to another according to a branching process. While this can lead to valuable insights in some domains, we aim to capture the incapacitation of institutional network assets under existing defensive strategies (firewalls, quarantining affected machines, and so forth), which result in uncertain graphs on which viral attacks may spread and the loss of operational capacity of potentially non-infected nodes, rendering the estimates of infected nodes an incomplete picture of losses. Also, there may be multiple sources of viral and non-viral attacks (e.g. distributed denial of service). Further, batches of nodes are commonly lost because (1) some viral attacks, once beyond a firewall, can spread to an entire subnet very quickly [8] , (2) viral detection often prompts administrators to quarantine subnets, (3) attacks may knock out a hub necessary for proper operation of adjacent nodes (e.g. a router) [4] , and (4) many communication networks can be characterized by scale-free networks, yielding clusters of highly interconnected groups of nodes [22, 28, 31 ] associated with particular subnets, increasing the threat of practically immediate internal contamination.
The primary target of our analysis will be the process in the vicinity of the first time that either a cumulative node loss component reaches a threshold M or a cumulative weight loss component reaches a threshold V . Formally, this will be an exit time of a multivariate marked point process with mutually dependent components from the open rectangle [0, M ) × [0, V ). As such, we draw upon the extensive literature on fluctuation theory [19-20, 24-26, 33-34] and properties of exit times of stochastic processes [1-3, 10-16, 21-22, 35] .
The crossing of these critical thresholds correspond to points at which network activity undergoes some important change in operation, whether it corresponds to the detection of malicious attacks as opposed to benign losses (e.g. temporary maintenance or ordinary hardware failures), the point at which the situation dictates a change in defensive policy, or the destruction of the network. Thus, we want to predict when such crossings will happen, the values of the components of the process at the crossing, and the like. Now, since the present paper focuses on application of previously obtained general results [10, 16] for random walks to the prediction of a failure of networks, we show in Section 3 that if the attacks form a marked Poisson process, special cases under delayed observations are tractable and they agree with results obtained by direct simulation.
EXIT TIME MODEL FOR NETWORKS
Let (Ω, F (Ω) , P ) be a probability space and let
(where ε c is a Dirac point measure) be a marked atomic random measure describing the evolution of damage to a network where attacks arrive upon each t k , at which n k nodes are incapacitated and their associated weights, w k = w k1 + ... + w kn k (w kj represents the nonnegative real weight of the jth node destroyed in the kth attack).
In addition, a real random n-vector representing the change in passive components for each node lost, yielding the last component of the mark: p k = p k1 + ... + p kn k , where p kj represents the change in the n passive components due to loss of the jth node of the kth attack). Altogether, we have
We assume the increments (n k , w k , p k ) are jointly independent and identically distributed (iid)
for k ∈ N and each is independent of (n 0 , w 0 , p 0 ), though components are mutually dependent.
Furthermore, we assume the common probability-generating function (PGF) of each n k is g (z), the common Laplace-Stieltjes transform (LST) of each w kj is l (v), and the common n-variate moment-generating function of each p kj is m (α). In addition, we assume each w k and p k are conditionally independent given n k .
We define the joint transform of the increments as
Using the transforms above with iterated expectation and the conditional independence of w k and p k given n k , we can simplify this as
Consider the continuous time parameter process associated with the random measure N ⊗W ⊗P introduced in (2.1),
However, we will suppose the process is observed only upon the following delayed renewal process (rather than in real-time)
where ∆ k = τ k − τ k−1 for k ∈ N 0 and τ −1 = 0, where each ∆ k is iid for k ≥ 1, and independent of ∆ 0 .
Next, we define the increments of the process upon the observations at each τ k ,
where k ∈ N. We will also denote the values of the cumulative process upon the observations
Therefore, we can write the increments as
With the delayed observation, the joint functionals of the increments depend on the amount of time since the previous observation because some nonnegative integer number of attacks will occur during each observation epoch ( τ k−1 , τ k ] whereas previously we knew the increment (n k , w k , p k ) corresponded to exactly 1 attack. As such, the modified functional of the increment is
where |z| ≤ 1, Re(v) ≥ 0, Re(θ) ≥ 0, α ∈ C n . Note that since the increments (other than the initial one) are identically distributed, we will have just two unique joint increment transforms
(2.14)
where (2.15) is equal to γ k for all k ∈ N.
We will be interested in the first observation epoch when the cumulative node loss component crosses a fixed threshold M ∈ N, or the cumulative weight loss component crosses a threshold V ∈ R + , whichever comes first. Then, we define the first observed passage index
while τ ρ is called the first observed passage time. We refer to N and W as the active components of the process (whereas P and time are passive).
Throughout the rest of this article, we consider various marginal and semi-marginal variants of the joint functional
of the cumulative number of nodes lost, cumulative weight lost, time, and additional components at the observation before (i.e. the pre-observed passage time) and after (i.e. the first observed passage time) the first threshold crossing under special assumptions.
APPLICATION TO POISSONIAN ATTACK PROCESS
In this section we will derive analytically tractable probabilistic results for the network exit time model under delayed observation for a special case. First, we assume attacks occur according to a marked Poisson process,
where {t 1 , t 2 , ...} is a Poisson point process of rate λ on the nonnegative real line with the marks (n k , w k , p k ) under observation by the delayed renewal process {τ 0 , τ 1 , τ 2 , ...} as explained in Section 2.
We will derive expressions for marginal and semi-marginal versions of the functional Φ as well as show how they lead to probabilistic results, such as moments and distributions, for the values of each component of the process in the random vicinities of the exit time.
By assuming Poisson attack occurrences, we can make the joint transforms of the increments of the process (2.14-2.15) more explicit (see Lemma A.1 from Appendix A):
where L 0 and L are the Laplace-Stieltjes transforms of ∆ 0 and ∆ k (for k ∈ N), respectively.
The following transforms will be a useful tool through which we derive analytically tractable results. Denote
Here LC p is the Laplace-Carson transform:
with the inverse
where
w is the inverse of the Laplace transform. The operator D q is defined as
where {f (q)} is a sequence, with the inverse (for r ∈ N)
The inverse of D pq is denoted
According to [10] , under the assumption (N (0) , W (0) , P (0)) = (0, 0, 0),
Results for a Special Case
We will derive analytically tractable results under a special case according to the following 
Proof. Using assumption 1, we have
where we set
Combining this with (3.10), 
which is constant with respect to x, allowing us to find
and calculate the inverse Laplace-Carson transform LC −1 w :
After applying assumption 4 for l, we manipulate the expression into an appropriate form and carry out the inversion
We are left with
Marginal Transforms upon τ ρ
In this section, we will find the marginal transforms of the active components and time upon the first observed passage time. First, we find the marginal PGF of the cumulative node loss component at the first observed passage time, N ρ .
Corollary 3.2. Under assumptions 1-4,
Proof. We have d = z and
Altogether, we have
Next, we find the marginal LST of the cumulative weight lost upon the first observed passage time, W ρ . 
Proof. We have
z=1,θ=0,β=0
Lastly, we find the marginal Laplace-Stieltjes transform of the first observed passage time τ ρ , Φ (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, θ, 0, 0) = E e −θτρ , which follows trivially from Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.4. Under assumptions 1-4,
E e −θτρ = Φ (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, θ, 0, 0)
Additional Probabilistic Results
In this section, we provide a sampling of the explicit results that can be found via the marginal transforms from the previous section and demonstrate how well they match their respective random variables found via simulations of the process (as explained in Appendix B).
Theorem 3.5. Under assumptions 1-4,
Proof. Using E[z Nρ ] of Corollary 3.2, we can find the mean
We manipulate the PGF into a more suitable form, with s = λ+µ λ+bµ ,
Next, we find the mean of the cumulative weight loss component upon the first observed passing time.
Theorem 3.6. Under assumptions 1-4,
Proof. 
Then, applying the derivative and limit,
Simulations of the process agree with the above formulas. For each set of parameters, we generated 1,000 realizations of the process by the method described in Appendix B, yielding the following results (with sample means and absolute errors): The highest error occurs for E [N ρ ] with parameter set 6, but the relative error even here is only 0.00619, and it is typically much smaller.
Lastly, we will derive the PDF of the first observed passage time τ ρ.
Theorem 3.7. Under assumptions 1-4,
and λ, µ, and
Proof. We will use the LST E e −θτρ from Corollary 3.4 and
So we have
λ+θ . Using this and the formula above, we can write φ (1, 0, θ, 0) in a more convenient form
Thus, the remaining inverse transform can be separated into three parts
Suppose µ, λ, and λ b are distinct, then we can give a more explicit form of the inversion. With this, we can do the inversion in (3.34):
The inversion of (3.36) is the same as the previous with M = j + 1. Combining the completed inverse transform with these yields
Since Λ is a Poisson counting measure,
where L is the LST of ∆ 1
where L 0 is the LST of ∆ 0 .
B Simulation
The following is a high-level overview of one simulation of the process until the first observed passage time for a particular set of parameters (λ, µ, a, ξ, M, V ): In other words, we generate an observation time, generate the number of attacks within the observation time, generate the number of nodes lost in each attack, generate a weight for each node lost, and repeat with successive observation epochs until the first threshold is crossed, at which time we record the crossing values of each component.
While this code generates the observation before the attacks rather than generating attacks and then observing them (which we are actually modeling), the independent increments property of the attack process (Poisson point process) renders this strategy probabilistically equivalent and yields simpler code.
In the numbers provided in Section 3, we generate a sample by running the simulation many times and average the crossing values, each of which are iid random variables with finite mean, so each converges almost surely to the true mean by the strong law of large numbers.
C Validation that F τ ρ is a PDF
We will next prove that F τρ of Theorem 3.7 is a PDF as some supporting confirmation of the many calculations leading up to it.
Since φ i (0) = 0, F τρ (0) = 0. Since lim ϑ→∞ e −λϑ ϑ r = 0 for all r ∈ N 0 , we have
Since the rest of F τρ (ϑ) is independent of ϑ, we find
and the same follows for
Lastly, we show that F τρ (ϑ) is monotone increasing. First, note that K is the probability that a Poisson(ξV ) R.V. is less than or equal to M − 2, so 0 < 1 − K < 1. Thus, if φ i (ϑ) is monotone increasing (which would imply φ i (ϑ) is nonnegative since φ i (0) = 0) for each i, then F τρ (ϑ) is monotone increasing.
Lemma C.1. φ i (ϑ) is monotone increasing.
Proof. First, we find the derivative with respect to ϑ Altogether, we have verified F τρ (ϑ) is a probability distribution function.
